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Although it seems intuitively clear that
acts of requesting are different from acts
of commanding, it is not very easy to
sate their differences precisely in dynamic
terms. In this paper we show that it
becomes possible to characterize, at least
partially, the effects of acts of requesting
and compare them with the effects of acts
of commanding by combining dynamified
deontic logic with epistemic logic. One in-
teresting result is the following: each act
of requesting is appropriately differenti-
ated from an act of commanding with the
same content, but for each act of request-
ing, there is another act of commanding
with much more complex content which
updates models in exactly the same way as
it does. We will also consider an applica-
tion of our characterization of acts of re-
questing to acts of asking yes-no questions.
It yields a straightforward formalization of
the view of acts of asking questions as re-
quests for information.
Keywords: request, command, yes-no
question, dynamified deontic logic, epis-
temic logic
1. Introduction
Acts of requesting seem undoubtedly
different from acts of commanding. As
Searle and Vanderveken have clearly
stated, a request “allows for the pos-
sibility of refusal” (Searle and Van-
derveken 1985, 199), but a command
“commits the speaker to not giving
him [= the commandee (the present
author’s clarification)] the option of
refusal” (op. cit., 201). Of course
this does not mean that it is impos-
sible to refuse to obey a command;
but “when one refuses to obey an or-
der or command, one cannot say that
one refuses the order or command but
rather that one refuses to obey it” be-
cause “[s]trictly speaking, one can only
accept or refuse a speech act that allows
for the option of acceptance or refusal”
(op. cit., 195). Thus “one can say lit-
erally ‘I refused the offer’ or ‘I refused
the invitation’ ”(ibid.), but one cannot
say “I refused the command.”
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But what does this difference amount to in dynamic terms? In what way is the
situation after an act of requesting different from the situation after an act of
commanding? And what effects does an act of requesting bring about if it does
not exclude the possibility of refusal? The purpose of this paper is to answer these
and other related questions concerning the distinction between requesting and
commanding by developing a dynamic logic in which effects of acts of requesting
and commanding can be compared. For this purpose we will extend DMDL+III
(“Dynamified” Multi-agent Deontic Logic + alethic modality III) developed in
Yamada (2008a), by adding epistemic operators to it. Since an act of requesting
allows for the possibility of refusal, an agent who makes a request will be in need
of knowing whether it will be granted or refused, and an appropriate response
to a request should address this question. One interesting result is the following:
each act of requesting is appropriately differentiated from an act of commanding
with the same content, but for each act of requesting, there is another act of
commanding with much more complex content which updates models in exactly
the same way as it does. We will also consider an application of our analysis of
acts of requesting to acts of asking yes-no questions. It yields a straightforward
formalization of the view of acts of asking questions as requests for information.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the development
of dynamified deontic logics that leads to DMDL+III closely, and show how acts
of commanding and acts of promising are modeled in DMDL+III. In Section 3, we
add epistemic operators to DMDL+III, and briefly examine what more can be said
about acts of commanding and promising with their help. We then show how
the workings of acts of requesting can be captured in the extended logic DMEDL
(Dynamified Multi-agent Epistemic Deontic Logic) in Section 4. In Section 5, we
first compare acts of requesting with acts of commanding further in order to show
how each act of requesting is differentiated from an act of commanding with the
same content (this illustrates the first part of the above mentioned result), and
then show how our analysis of acts of requesting can be applied to the formal-
ization of the notion of questions as requests for information by modeling acts
of asking yes-no questions. In Section 6, we prove the second part of the above
mentioned result: for each act of requesting, there is another act of commanding
with much more complex content which updates models in exactly the same way
as it does. Then we conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this
result and further research possibilities in Section 7.
Before proceeding to the next section, we would like to make a disclaimer here
in order to make our goal clear. When we talk about acts of requesting and com-
manding in this paper, we have acts of commanding and requesting performed
in a natural language in mind. But we will not deal directly with the semantics
of natural language sentences used in performing these acts, but rather with the
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dynamic nature of the performed acts themselves. We will try to characterize
what acts of commanding and acts of requesting are in terms of the effects they
bring about. In doing so, we will not aim to capture the pragmatic mechanisms
that explain, for example, how the utterance of one and the same sentence of nat-
ural language counts as the performance of an act of commanding in one context
and that of an act of requesting in another, either. We will rather aim to capture
what the act of commanding and the act of requesting accomplish when they are
performed in the respective contexts, and retrospectively elucidate each act as the
kind of act that accomplishes those kinds of things.
2. Acts of commanding and acts of promising in DMDL+III
DMDL
+
III is one of the “dynamified” logics inspired by the development of sys-
tems of DEL (Dynamic Epistemic Logic). In this section, we first give a brief
look at PAL (Public Announcement Logic), the simplest system that falls under
DEL, and illustrate how it dynamifies static epistemic logic. Then we closely re-
view the development of ECL (Eliminative Command Logic), the simplest logic
that deals with acts of commanding. It dynamifies static deontic logic just like
DEL dynamifies static epistemic logic. As DMDL+III is a refinement of ECL, most
of the concepts necessary for understanding DMDL+III can be explained in sim-
pler forms in reviewing the development of ECL. After that, we will show how
DMDL
+
III refines ECL in two steps.
2.1. A brief look at PAL
The development of PAL is illustrated in Figure 1 on Page 62 in the form of a
diagram. As the upward arrow in Figure 1 indicates, PAL is obtained by adding
dynamic modalities, which represent public announcements, to EL. EL is a multi-
agent variant of the standard epistemic logic, and the formula of the form Kiϕ
means that the agent i knows that ϕ. The formula of the form [ϕ!]ξ of PAL
means that ξ holds after every truthful public announcement that ϕ, and thus
the formula of the form [ϕ!]Kiψmeans that the agent i knows that ψ after every
truthful public announcement that ϕ.
Given a model M for EL and a world w of M , the public announcement modality




[ϕ!]ξ iff M ,w |=
PAL
ϕ implies Mϕ!,w |=PAL ξ ,
where Mϕ! is the “updated” model for EL obtained from M by replac-
ing the epistemic accessibility relation Ri for each agent i with its subset
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Figure 1: The development of PAL
Ri − {〈x, y〉 ∈ Ri | M , x |=PAL ϕ and M , y |=PAL ¬ϕ} − {〈x, y〉 ∈ Ri | M , x |=PAL¬ϕ and M , y |=
PAL
ϕ}.1 Note that the truth of the formula of the form [ϕ!]ξ at
w in M is defined in terms of the truth of the content ϕ of the announcement
ϕ! at w in M and the truth of its subformula ξ at w in the updated model Mϕ!.
Thus the public announcement of the form ϕ! is interpreted as the type of the
events that change the situation (M ,w) into (Mϕ!,w). If ϕ is a formula of EL and
no operator of the form Ki occurs in ϕ, the formula of the form ϕ → [ϕ!]Kiϕ
is valid. This means that if ϕ is a non-modal formula, everyone comes to know
that ϕ after every truthful public announcement that ϕ.2 An interesting coun-
terexample to the unqualified version of this principle is an announcement of the
so-called “Moore formula” (ϕ ∧¬Kiϕ).
PAL is axiomatized by adding a set of so called “reduction axioms” and the neces-
sitation rule for each announcement modality to the proof system of EL. As the
downward arrow in Figure 1 indicates, the reduction axioms enable us to define
translation function t that takes any formula ϕ from PAL and yields a formula
t (ϕ) of EL that is provably equivalent to ϕ. This translation in turn enables us to
derive the completeness of PAL from the completeness of EL.
1This way of updating is usually called “link-cutting”. Another way of updating, called “world
elimination”, eliminates every non-ϕ worlds from the domain of the model and restricts Ri to the
new domain. For more on PAL and DEL, see van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi (2007) . It
gives a detailed state-of-the-art textbook exposition of the major systems of DEL as well as a useful
historical overview of their development.
2Although there can be various artificial agents to which this applies, it seems too strong to be
true of agents like us, as there is a possibility of disbelief on the side of the audience. There may
be people who are so sceptical that they do not always believe public announcements. This gap,
which is a gap between an illocutionary act (announcing that ϕ) and a perlocutionary act (getting
addressees to know that ϕ, or convincing them that ϕ), can be avoided if we reinterpret ϕ! as a type
of event in which agents simultaneously and publicly learn that ϕ. Then we can be said to have a
theory of (group) learnability in the form of DEL. For more on the gap, see Yamada (2008b).
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2.2. Acts of commanding in ECL
Inspired by the development of PAL and other dynamic epistemic logics, a se-
ries of dynamified deontic logics including DMDL+III are developed. Eliminative
Command Logic ECL developed in Yamada (2007a) is the simplest one in the se-
ries. Figure 2 on Page 63 shows the diagram of the development of ECL. Just
like PAL, ECL is obtained by adding dynamic modalities, which represent types
of acts of commanding, to the static base logic MDL+ (Multi-agent Deontic Logic
+ alethic modality) and is axiomatized by adding a set of reduction axioms and
necessitation rules for command modalities to the proof system of MDL+.








Figure 2: The development of ECL
The formula of the form Oiϕ means that it is obligatory upon agent i to see to it
that ϕ. Although indexing of deontic operators with a set of agents is not standard
in deontic logic, we need to be able to distinguish agents to whom commands are
given from other agents if we are to use deontic logic to reason about how acts
of commanding change situations. For this purpose, the language of MDL+ has
a separate deontic operator Oi for each agent i . The language and the models of
MDL
+ are defined as follows.3
Definition 2.1. Take a countably infinite set Aprop of proposition letters and a
finite set I of agents, with p ranging over Aprop and i over I . The multi-agent
deontic languageL
MDL
+ is given by:
ϕ ::=> | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ψ) | ϕ | Oiϕ .
We use standard abbreviations ∨,→,↔, and ◊. In addition, we abbreviate Oi¬ϕ
as Fiϕ, and ¬Oi¬ϕ as Piϕ.
3The definition of the models in this paper is slightly different from that of Yamada (2007a), but
there is no substantial difference.
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Definition 2.2. By an L
MDL
+ -model, we mean a tuple M = 〈W M, AM, {DMi | i ∈
I }, V M 〉 where:
(i) W M is a non-empty set (heuristically, of ‘possible worlds’ or ‘states’)
(ii) AM ⊆W M ×W M
(iii) DMi ⊆AM for each agent i ∈ I
(iv) V M is a function that assigns a subset V M (p) of W M to each proposition
letter p ∈Aprop.
Based on these definitions, the truth definition for the formulas ofL
MDL
+ is given
in a completely standard way by associating alethic modality  with AM and each
deontic modality Oi with D
M
i . Thus the formula of the form Oiϕ, for example,
is interpreted by the following clause:
M ,w |=
MDL
+ Oiϕ iff for any v such that 〈w,v〉 ∈DMi , M ,v |=MDL+ ϕ .
Note that the following axiom, called “Mix” is shown to be valid according to
these definitions:
Piϕ→ ◊ϕ .
This means that what is permitted is possible. The so-called axiom D of the
following form, however, is not valid:
Oiϕ→ Piϕ .
Since we may receive conflicting commands from different authorities, we cannot
assume D axiom to be valid, as we will see later.
Note also that no restrictions are imposed upon the alethic accessibility AM . Since
further restrictions do not affect the discussion in this paper, we will not bother
to add them. Thus,
Definition 2.3. The proof system for MDL+ contains the following axioms and
rules:
(Taut) all instantiations of propositional tautologies over the present lan-
guage
(-Dist) (ϕ→ψ)→ (ϕ→ψ) (-distribution)
(Oi -Dist) Oi (ϕ→ψ)→ (Oiϕ→Oiψ) (Oi -distribution)





(-Nec) If ϕ is proved, infer ϕ (-necessitation)
(Oi -Nec) If ϕ is proved, infer Oiϕ . (Oi -necessitation)
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The soundness and the completeness of this proof system can be proved in an
entirely standard way.
Now let’s move on to ECL. As we have seen in Figure 2, the language of ECL
is obtained by adding dynamic modalities, which represent types of acts of com-
manding, to the language of the static base logic MDL+. Thus,
Definition 2.4. Take the same countably infinite set Aprop of proposition letters
and the same finite set I of agents as before, with p ranging over Aprop and i over
I . The language of eliminative command logicL
ECL
is given by:
ϕ ::=> | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ψ) | ϕ | Oiϕ | [pi]ϕ
pi ::=!iϕ .
An expression of the form !iϕ, which we will call a command term, represents
the type of acts of commanding given to a commandee i to the effect that i should
see to it that ϕ, and the formula of the form [!iϕ]ψ means that ψ holds after i is
commanded to see to it that ϕ. Note that command terms are not formulas.4
The truth definition for this language is given with reference to anL
MDL
+ -model
by extending the truth definition forL
MDL
+ mutatis mutandis with the following
clause for the new formulas:
M ,w |=
ECL
[!iϕ]ψ iff M!iϕ,w |=ECL ψ ,
where M!iϕ is the updated LMDL+ -model obtained from M by replacing only the
deontic accessibility relation DMi for the agent i with its subset D
M!iϕ
i = {〈x, y〉 ∈
DMi | M , y |=ECL ϕ}. Thus, the update by the act of commanding of the type
!iϕ only cuts the arrows of deontic accessibility for the agent i which arrive in
non-ϕ-worlds in M ; it does not cut any arrows of deontic accessibility for other
agents.
Note that the truth of the formula of the form [!iϕ]ψ at w in M is defined in
terms of the truth of its subformula ψ at w in the updated model M!iϕ. This fits
the intended meaning of [!iϕ]ψ, namely that ψ holds after i is commanded to see
to it that ϕ. Note also that D
M!iϕ




Figure 3 on Page 66 gives an image of how an act of commanding works in an
example taken from Yamada (2007a). Imagine the following situation. You are
working in an office shared with your boss and a few other colleagues on a hot day
4This means that they can be neither premises nor conclusions of inferences by themselves.
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in summer. There is a window, but it is closed now. There is an air conditioner,
but it is not running now. The temperature is rising and it now is at 30 degrees






















Figure 3: Your boss’s command
Let p stand for the proposition that the window is open, q for the proposition
that the air conditioner is running, and r for the proposition that the temperature
is above 30 degree Celsius. The presence of formulas near the states indicates that
they hold in these states, and the absence of proposition letters near the states
(but not the absence of non-atomic formulas) indicates that they do not hold in
these states. The solid arrows represent the alethic accessibility, and the dotted
arrows represent the deontic accessibility for you, here represented by a.5 Thus
you can open the window, or turn on the air conditioner, or even ignore the heat
by concentrating on your work. All these alternatives are possible and permitted
for you in (M , s0).
But now you hear your boss’s voice. She commanded you to open the window.
The pair (M!a p , s0) represents the situation you are in after your boss’s act com-
manding. All the alternatives that were possible in (M , s0) are still possible in
(M!a p , s0). But in order to obey your boss’s command, you have to open the
window. It becomes the only permissible alternative to you now. This effect of
her command is modeled by cutting the arrows of deontic accessibility for you
that arrive in non-p-states in M . Thus we have M!a p , s0 |=ECL Oa p, and this in
turn means that we have M , s0 |=ECL [!a p]Oa p. The thick arrow from (M , s0) to
(M!a p , s0) is an imaginary arrow in the sense that it is neither in M nor in M!a p ,
5For the sake of simplicity, arrows of deontic accessibility relations for other people and the reflex-
ive arrows for alethic accessibility are omitted.
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but it helps us to understand your boss’s command of the form !a p as the event
that takes you from (M , s0) to (M!a p , s0).
Note that the treatment of acts of commanding in ECL is based on a simplifying
assumption that command issuing agents have suitable authority over comman-
dees. We follow this treatment in this paper.6 With the help of this simplifying
assumption, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 2.1 (The CUGO Principle). If ϕ is a formula of MDL+ and is free of
modal operators of the form Oi , [!iϕ]Oiϕ is valid.
This principle means that, though not without exceptions, commands usually
generate obligations (hence “CUGO”). It partially characterizes the effects of acts
of commanding.7 As we have said in Section 1, the purpose of this paper is to give




Note that the unqualified version of the CUGO principle is not valid. A bit of
terminology is of some help here. Let O be some modal operator. We call the
pair 〈x, y〉 of worlds an O-arrow and say y is O-accessible from x if 〈x, y〉 is in the
accessibility relation R that interprets O. Then we can say that the update by an
act of commanding of the type !iϕ cuts every Oi -arrow that arrives in ¬ϕ-worlds
in M . This guarantees that every Oi -arrow that remains after this update arrives
in a world in which ϕ holds in M . But this does not guarantee that ϕ holds there
in the updated model M!iϕ. If Oi occurs in ϕ, ϕ might be false at some world
Oi -accessible from w in M!iϕ.
ECL is axiomatized by adding a set of so-called “reduction axioms” and the neces-
sitation rule for each command operator to the proof system of MDL+. Thus,
Definition 2.5. The proof system for ECL contains all the axioms and all the rules
of the proof system for MDL+, and in addition the following reduction axioms
and rules:
(RA1) [!iϕ]p↔ p where p ∈Aprop
(RA2) [!iϕ]>↔>
(RA3) [!iϕ]¬ψ↔¬[!iϕ]ψ
(RA4) [!iϕ](ψ∧χ )↔ ([!iϕ]ψ∧ [!iϕ]χ )
6The standard method used in order to treat preconditions for action like this is to introduce a
function p r e that assigns to each event term e its precondition p r e(e). For more on this, see
Baltag, Moss, and Solecki (1998) or van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi (2007).
7This characterization is partial because acts of commanding involve other effects as well. For more
on this, see Sections 6 and 7.
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(RA5) [!iϕ]ψ↔[!iϕ]ψ
(RA6) [!iϕ]O jψ↔O j [!iϕ]ψ where i 6= j
(RA7) [!iϕ]Oiψ↔Oi (ϕ→ [!iϕ]ψ)
([!iϕ]-Nec) If ψ is proved, infer [!iϕ]ψ .
The crucial axiom here is RA7. The formula on the left hand side, [!iϕ]Oiψ,
states that Oiψ holds after the update. The formula on the right hand side speci-
fies the necessary and sufficient condition for this in terms of what holds before
the update. Take an arbitraryL
MDL
+ -model M and a world w of M . In order for
Oiψ to hold in w in the updated model M!iϕ, ψ must hold in every world Oi -
accessible from w in M!iϕ. But those worlds are exactly the ϕ-worlds in M that are
Oi -accessible from w in M . In order for ψ to hold in those worlds after the up-
date, [!iϕ]ψ has to hold in those world before the update. Thus Oi (ϕ→ [!iϕ]ψ)
has to hold in w in M .
Note that the first two axioms enable us to eliminate command operators prefixed
to proposition letters and>. The remaining axioms enable us to reduce the length
of the subformula to which command operators are prefixed step by step. Thus
these axioms enable us to define translation function that takes any formula of
ECL and yields a formula of MDL+ which is provably equivalent to the original
formula. This translation in turn enables us to derive the completeness of ECL
from that of MDL+.
2.3. Conflicting commands in ECL and ECLII
Now we can move on to refinements. The following results about ECL are re-
ported in Yamada (2007a):
Proposition 2.2 (The Dead End Principle). [!i (ϕ ∧¬ϕ)]Oiξ is valid.
Proposition 2.3 (The Restricted Sequential Conjunction Principle). If ϕ and ψ
are formulas of MDL+ and free of modal operators of the form Oi , [!iϕ][!iψ]ξ ↔
[!i (ϕ ∧ψ)]ξ is valid.
The dead end principle means that if an agent receives a command with contra-
dictory content, everything comes to be obligatory upon him. The situation of
this kind is usually called “deontic explosion”. Since the updated by !i (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
cuts every Oi -arrow that arrives in a ¬(ϕ∧¬ϕ)-world, it cuts every Oi -arrow, and
so DM
!i (ϕ∧¬ϕ)
i becomes empty. Thus Oiξ becomes vacuously true in every world
after the update by !i (ϕ ∧¬ϕ).
If we put ¬ϕ in the place of ψ in the restricted sequential conjunction principle,
we get deontic explosion again. Situations of this kind can arise in real life as
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II and ECLII refine MDL+ and ECL respectively in order to deal with con-
flicting commands in a more satisfactory way by indexing deontic operators and
deontic accessibility relations by the set I × I of pairs of agents (Yamada 2007b).
Thus the formula of the form O(i , j )ϕ from the static base logic MDL
+
II means
that it is obligatory upon an agent i with respect to the authority j to see to it
that ϕ, and the formula of the form [!(i , j )ϕ]ψ of the dynamified logic ECLII means
that ψ holds after an authority j ’s act of commanding an agent i to see to it that
ϕ. The definitions of the languages, the models, the relations of truth in models,
and the proof systems for MDL+II and ECLII are given in the same way as those
for MDL+ and ECL except for the indexing by I × I .
Since I is a finite set, indexing by I × I is just an instance of indexing by a finite
set. Thus MDL+II and ECLII are just another instantiations of MDL+ and ECL
respectively, hence all the results obtained for MDL+ and ECL apply to MDL+II
and ECLII mutatis mutandis. In particular, the CUGO principle now reads:
Proposition 2.4 (The CUGO Principle). If ϕ is a formula of MDL+II and is free of
modal operators of the form O(i , j ), [!(i , j )ϕ]O(i , j )ϕ is valid.
With the help of this principle, we now have:
(M!(a,b ) p )!(a,c)¬p ,w |=ECLII (O(a,b ) p ∧O(a,c)¬p) .
This is the situation a will be in after a receives a command from an authority c to
the effect that a should see to it that ¬p after a receives a command from another
authority b to the effect that a should see to it that p. Since it is not possible to
obey both commands in this example, a has to decide which command to obey.
Note that this combination of incompatible commands does not generally pro-
duce deontic explosion. In (M!(a,b ) p )!(a,c)¬p , p-worlds that are O(a,b )-accessible in M
(if any) and ¬p-worlds that are O(a,c)-accessible in M (if any) will remain O(a,b )-
accessible and O(a,c)-accessible respectively, since the update by !(a,b ) p only cuts
O(a,b )-arrows arriving in ¬p-worlds in M and the update by !(a,c)¬p only cuts
O(a,c)-arrows arriving in p-worlds in M . Deontic explosions occur only when in-
compatible commands are given to one and the same agent by one and the same
authority or an authority issues a command having contradictory content. If the
8Thus D Axiom cannot be included in the proof system of MDL+.
69
EuJAP | VOL. 7 | No. 2 | 2011
command issuing authority is rational, such a situation will be avoided; otherwise,
obedience could not be expected.9
Note also that similar conflicts can arise between requests as well as between a





III refines ECLII further in order to model acts of promising along with
acts of commanding (Yamada, 2008a). In the case of acts of commanding, obliga-
tions commandees owe are created by command issuing authorities (commanders,
for short).10 But in the case of acts of promising, obligations owed by agents who
give promises (promisers, for short) are created by promisers themselves. More-
over, agents to whom promises are given (promisees, for short) will be entitled to
rely on promisers to do what they have promised to do. In order to deal with this
complexities, deontic operators and their corresponding accessibility relations are
indexed by the set I × I × I in the static base logic MDL+III. As before, indexing
by I × I × I is just indexing by a finite set, and thus MDL+III is yet another instan-
tiation of MDL+. But this time DMDL+III includes more than ECL does. It deals
not only with acts of commanding but also with acts of promising.11
In MDL+III and in DMDL+III, the formula of the form O(i , j ,k)ϕ means that it is
obligatory upon agent i with respect to j in the name of k to see to it that ϕ. The
agent i here is the agent who owes the obligation (sometimes called an obligor), j
is the agent to whom the obligation is owed (sometimes called an obligee), and k
is the creator of the obligation. As we will see shortly, they need not be distinct.
In DMDL+III, the formula of the form [Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ means that ψ holds after
an agent i commands an agent j to see to it that ϕ, and the formula of the form
[P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ means that ψ holds after an agent i promises an agent j that she
(i ) will see to it that ϕ. Note that the order of the parameters in the command
term Com(i , j )ϕ is changed from that of the term !(i , j )ϕ of ECLII. In Com(i , j )ϕ, i
is the commander and j is the commandee.
In the truth definition for the language of DMDL+III, the added dynamic formulas
9Weakening of some inference rules are proposed in the literature on deontic logic in order to avoid
deontic explosions. Yamada (2008b) suggests the possibility of representing moral conflicts with-
out triggering deontic explosions by modeling moral principles as command issuing authorities.
10Note that the use of “commander” here is not meant to be understood as referring to military
rank.
11Thus, it is not called ECLIII.
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[P r om(i , j )ϕ]ξ iff MP r om(i , j )ϕ,w |=DMDL+III ξ ,
where
(1) MCom(i , j )ϕ is theLMDL+III-model obtained from M by replacing DM( j ,i ,i) with
its subset {〈x, y〉 ∈DM( j ,i ,i) |M , y |=DMDL+III ϕ}, and
(2) MP r om(i , j )ϕ is theLMDL+III-model obtained from M by replacing DM(i , j ,i) with
its subset {〈x, y〉 ∈DM(i , j ,i) |M , y |=DMDL+III ϕ}.
Thus the update by Com(i , j )ϕ only cuts O( j ,i ,i)-arrows arriving in ¬ϕ-worlds in
the original model M , and the update by P r om(i , j )ϕ only cuts O(i , j ,i)-arrows
arriving in ¬ϕ-world in the original model M .
Again, we have:
Proposition 2.5. The CUGO Principle: If ϕ is a formula of MDL+III and is free of
modal operators of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Com(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ϕ is valid.
And in addition to this, we have:
Proposition 2.6. The PUGO Principle: If ϕ is a formula of MDL+III and is free of
modal operators of the form O(i , j ,i), [P r om(i , j )ϕ]O(i , j ,i)ϕ is valid.
These principles partially capture how acts of commanding and promising work.
Note the differences between the obligations generated. In the case of the obliga-
tion generated by an act of commanding the commandee j owes the obligation
created by the commander i , but in the case of the obligation generated by an act
of promising the promiser i owes the obligation created by the promiser i her-
self, and the promisee j is the agent whom the obligation is owed. This difference
enables us to consider the obligations created by acts of promising as representing
the commitments of the promisers. This point will be of some importance when
we analyze acts of requesting. 12
We are now in a position to extend MDL+III and DMDL+III.
12There may be room for disagreement over whether the notion of the agent whom the obligation
is owed make sense with respect to the obligation created by an act of commanding. But we will
not pursue this point here.
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3. The securing of uptake in DMEDL
We add epistemic operators to MDL+III. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore
alethic modality. Thus we define:
Definition 3.1. Take a countably infinite set Aprop of proposition letters, and a
finite set I of agents, with p ranging over Aprop, and i , j , k over I . The language
L
MEDL
of the Multi-agent Epistemic Deontic Logic MEDL is given by:
ϕ ::=> | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ψ) | Kiϕ | O(i , j ,k)ϕ
Definition 3.2. By an L
MEDL
-model, we mean a tuple M = 〈W M, {EMi | i ∈
I }, {DM(i , j ,k) | i , j ,k ∈ I }, V M 〉 where:
(i) W M is a non-empty set (heuristically, of ‘possible worlds’ or ‘states’)
(ii) EMi is an equivalence relation such that E
M
i ⊆W M ×W M
(iii) DM(i , j ,k) ⊆W M ×W M
(iv) V M is a function that assigns a subset V M (p) of W M to each proposition
letter p ∈Aprop.
The truth definition (defining the relation |=
MEDL
) and the definition of the proof
system (defining the relation `
MEDL
) can be given in an entirely standard way.
Since MEDL is a simple fusion of the deontic fragment of MDL+III and the multi-
agent variant of the standard epistemic logic, there is a complete axiomatization
of it.
We dynamify MEDL into DMEDL (Dynamified MEDL) by adding the dynamic
modalities indexed by action terms of the forms Com(i , j )ϕ, P r om(i , j )ϕ and
Req(i , j )ϕ. The formula of the form [Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ and the formula of the form
[P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ are interpreted in exactly the same way as in DMDL
+
III, except
with reference to L
MEDL







Thus we again have the DMEDL versions of the CUGO principle and the PUGO
principle.
Before moving on to the analysis of acts of requesting, we take a brief look at
what more we can say about acts of commanding and promising in DMEDL. One
immediate consequence of having epistemic operators is the fact that we can now
talk about the knowledge agents have about effects of speech acts. When a com-
mand is successfully given, for example, the commandee must know what com-
mand she has been given. Unless the force and the content is understood, no
illocutionary act can be successfully performed, since the effects of illocutionary
acts depend on the agreement on (and so the understanding of) what has been
performed. Surprisingly, the following principles are valid in DMEDL:
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Proposition 3.1. The CUGU Principle: If ϕ is a formula of DMEDL and is free of
modal operators of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Com(i , j )ϕ]K jO( j ,i ,i)ϕ is valid.
Proposition 3.2. The PUGU Principle: If ϕ is a formula of DMEDL and is free of
modal operators of the form O(i , j ,i), [P r om(i , j )ϕ]K jO(i , j ,i)ϕ is valid.
These principles state that acts of commanding and acts of promising usually gen-
erate knowledge of the effects captured in the CUGO principle and the PUGO
principle respectively on the side of addressees.
We call these principles “CUGU” and “PUGU” because we believe that these
principles characterize what Austin calls “the securing of uptake”. According to
Austin, “the securing of uptake” means “bringing about the understanding of the
meaning and of the force of the locution”. It is the “effect” that “must be achieved
on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out.” And so,“the per-
formance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake” (Austin, 1955,
117-118). In the case of an act of commanding, the understanding of the force
means the understanding of the commander’s locution as an act of commanding
and the understanding of the meaning of her locution includes the understanding
of what is commanded. The CUGU principle partially characterizes what these
understanding amount to. The same thing can be said of the PUGU principle as
well.
We said “surprisingly” above because no epistemic update operation is required
for these results. Take any model M , any world w of M , and any proposition
letter p for example. After an act of commanding of the form Com(i , j ) p is per-
formed in a situation (M ,w), O( j ,i ,i) p holds in any world v in the updated model
MCom(i , j ) p as every O( j ,i ,i)-arrow arriving in a non-p-world of M is eliminated in
MCom(i , j ) p , and every p-world of M remains to be a p-world in MCom(i , j ) p . But
if O( j ,i ,i) p holds in any world in the updated model MCom(i , j ) p , it holds in any
world K j -accessible from any world of M . Thus K jO( j ,i ,i) p holds in any world in
MCom(i , j ) p .
We need to note, however, that the same thing holds for any agent i ∈ I . It
means that everyone comes to know that O( j ,i ,i) p in w in MCom(i , j ) p . This is
natural when we consider a small everyday situation like the situation of the
shared office on the hot summer day we considered earlier. But even in a small
everyday situations like this, there are many ways in which only some of the
agents come to know what speech act is performed by a particular person at a
particular time.
Here it is important to understand how everyone comes to know O( j ,i ,i) p in w in
MCom(i , j ) p . Although the update by Com(i , j ) p does not affect any epistemic acces-
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sibility relations, it makes O( j ,i ,i) p true in any worlds epistemically accessible for
each agent. In that sense, the independence of each agent’s epistemic accessibility
relation from that of others does not fully model the privacy of knowledge in the
context of dynamified modal logics. The standard way to model the distinction
between agents who know what happens and those who do not is to introduce the
so-called “event models”, in which (un)certainty of each agent as regards what has
happened is modeled, and define the update operation called “product update”.
If we do this for MEDL, our current update by Com(i , j )ϕ will be modeled as the
special case of product update by the event model in which every agent knows
that an event of the type Com(i , j )ϕ happens. Although it is possible to extend
MEDL by introducing event models and product update, we will not pursue this
possibility here as there are many things yet to be done before making life more
complicated.13
4. Acts of requesting in DMEDL
Now we move on to the analysis of acts of requesting. As we have seen in Section
1, an act of requesting allows the possibility of refusal. As a consequence of this,
the following principle is not valid even if no operators of the form O( j ,i ,i) occur
in ϕ:
[Req(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ϕ .
In this respect, acts of requesting stand in sharp contrast to acts of commanding,
for which we have the CUGO principle. But it is also clear that it would not
be without any problems if an agent who has been requested to do something (a
requestee, for short) gives no response. Although it is not obligatory upon the
requestee to do what is requested, it is obligatory upon her to decide whether she
should do what is requested. Moreover, she has to let the agent who has made the
request (the requester, for short) know her decision.
If the requestee j decides that she should do what is requested, and the requested
action is not the kind of thing to be done on the spot, she can promise the re-
quester i that she ( j ) will do what is requested. As the PUGU principle indicates,
the requester i will know that O( j ,i , j )ϕ. If the requestee j decides that she ( j )
should reject the request, she ( j ) should let the requester i know that ¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ.
Now what about the case in which what is requested can be done on the spot.
If the requestee j decides that she should do what is requested, she might do it
on the spot without saying anything. Whether we should count this as the third
alternative way of responding to an act of requesting, or consider it as skipping
13I have benefitted from a discussion with Johan van Benthem on this point. For more on the
product update, see Baltag, Moss, and Solecki (1998) or van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi
(2007).
74
Tomoyuki Yamada | Acts of Requesting in Dynamic Logic of Knowledge and Obligation
to the sequel of an implicit promise might be a matter of opinion. We take the
formulation with the three options.14 Thus the clause for the formula of the form
[Req(i , j )ϕ]ξ reads:
M ,w |=
DMEDL
[Req(i , j )ϕ]ξ iff MReq(i , j )ϕ,w |=DMEDL ξ ,
where MReq(i , j )ϕ is the LMEDL-model obtained from M by replacing DM( j ,i ,i) with
its subset {〈x, y〉 ∈DM( j ,i ,i) |M , y |=DMEDL (ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ)}.15
This interpretation supports the following principles.
Proposition 4.1. The RUGO Principle: If ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is
free of modal operators of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Req(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)(ϕ ∨ KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨
Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) is valid.
Proposition 4.2. The RUGU Principle: If ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is
free of modal operators of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Req(i , j )ϕ]K jO( j ,i ,i)(ϕ ∨ KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨
Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) is valid.
We are now in a position to define the proof system for DMEDL. We first list
three sets of reduction axioms.
Theorem 4.1 (Reduction axioms for acts of commanding). The following axioms
are valid in DMEDL.
(C1) [Com(i , j )ϕ]p↔ p
(C2) [Com(i , j )ϕ]>↔>
(C3) [Com(i , j )ϕ]¬ψ↔¬[Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(C4) [Com(i , j )ϕ](ψ∧χ )↔ [Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ∧ [Com(i , j )ϕ]χ
(C5) [Com(i , j )ϕ]Klψ↔Kl [Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(C6) [Com(i , j )ϕ]O(l ,m,n)ψ↔O(l ,m,n)[Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ if 〈l ,m,n〉 6= 〈 j , i , i〉
(C7) [Com(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ψ↔O( j ,i ,i)(ϕ→ [Com(i , j )ϕ]ψ)
14Traum (1999, 195) also talks about similar obligations as effects of acts of requesting, but he
includes only the options of accepting or refusing.
15The formulation with two options can be obtained by using {〈x, y〉 ∈ DM( j ,i ,i) |M , y |=DMEDL
(KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ)} instead.
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Theorem 4.2 (Reduction axioms for acts of Promising). The following axioms are
valid in DMEDL.
(P1) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]p↔ p
(P2) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]⊥↔⊥
(P3) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]¬ψ↔¬[P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(P4) [P r om(i , j )ϕ](ψ∧χ )↔ [P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ∧ [P r om(i , j )ϕ]χ
(P5) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]Klψ↔Kl [P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(P6) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]O(l ,m,n)ψ↔O(l ,m,n)[P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ if 〈l ,m,n〉 6= 〈i , j , i〉
(P7) [P r om(i , j )ϕ]O(i , j ,i)ψ↔O(i , j ,i)(ϕ→ [P r om(i , j )ϕ]ψ)
Theorem 4.3 (Reduction axioms for acts of Requesting). The following axioms are
valid in DMEDL.
(R1) [Req(i , j )ϕ]p↔ p
(R2) [Req(i , j )ϕ]⊥↔⊥
(R3) [Req(i , j )ϕ]¬ψ↔¬[Req(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(R4) [Req(i , j )ϕ](ψ∧χ )↔ [Req(i , j )ϕ]ψ∧ [Req(i , j )ϕ]χ
(R5) [Req(i , j )ϕ]Klψ↔Kl [Req(i , j )ϕ]ψ
(R6) [Req(i , j )ϕ]O(l ,m,n)ψ↔O(l ,m,n)[Req(i , j )ϕ]ψ if 〈l ,m,n〉 6= 〈 j , i , i〉
(R7) [Req(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ψ ↔ O( j ,i ,i)((ϕ ∨ KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨ Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) →
[Req(i , j )ϕ]ψ)
As before, the first two axioms of each group enable us to eliminate dynamic
operators prefixed to proposition letters and >. The remaining axioms enable us
to reduce the length of the subformula to which dynamic operators are prefixed
step by step.
Now we define:
Definition 4.1 (The proof system for DMEDL). The proof system for DMEDL is
comprised of
(1) all the axioms and rules of the proof system for MEDL,
(2) all the reduction axioms for acts of commanding,
(3) all the reduction axioms for acts of promising,
(4) all the reduction axioms for acts of requesting, and in addition,
(5) the necessitation rules for the dynamic operators [Com(i , j )ϕ],
[P r om(i , j )ϕ], and [Req(i , j )ϕ].
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Since the above three sets of reduction axioms jointly enable us to define trans-
lation function that takes any formula from the language of DMEDL and yields
the formula of MEDL that is provably equivalent to the original formula, we can
derive the completeness of DMEDL from the completeness of MEDL. Thus we
have:
Theorem 4.4 (The completeness of DMEDL). The proof system defined above com-
pletely axiomatizes DMEDL.
5. Commanding, requesting, and asking questions in DMEDL
In this section, we first review the CUGO principle and the RUGO principle.
The CUGO Principle If ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is free of modal operators
of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Com(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ϕ is valid.
The RUGO Principle If ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is free of modal operators
of the form O( j ,i ,i), [Req(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)(ϕ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) is valid.
In the following discussions, we assume that ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is free
of modal operators of the form O( j ,i ,i), unless stated otherwise.
As we have seen, the CUGO principle is valid while [Req(i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)ϕ is not.
This fact enables us to understand clearly the sense in which acts of commanding
do not allow for the the option of refusal. It becomes obligatory upon the agent
j to see to it that ϕ after the act of commanding of the form Com(i , j )ϕ as the
CUGO principle states, but not after the act of requesting of the form Req(i , j )ϕ.
Moreover, the RUGO principle enables us to understand in what sense the option
of refusal is allowed for in the act of requesting of the form Req(i , j )ϕ. Seeing to
it that Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ is one of the three ways of meeting the obligation of the form
O( j ,i ,i)(ϕ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ). In that sense refusal is a legitimate response
to an act of requesting but not to an act of commanding.
We then move on to acts of asking yes-no questions and examine how the RUGO
principle works in modeling them. The notion of question as a kind of imperative
or request can be found in various authors including Åqvist (1965), Searle (1979),
Hintikka (1981), and Searle and Vanderveken(1985).16 Our analysis can be applied
to the formalization of the notion of questions as requests for information in a
16There are various approaches to questions. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997) offers a detailed
survey of the field, and argues against Searle and Vanderveken’s approach, arguing for the semantic
approach to imperative sentences. Since we are not dealing with the semantics of natural language
imperative sentences, “a priori there is no clash between” their semantic approach and our analysis
as they notes (op. cit., 1074). For more recent works, see Minica˘ (2011).
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straightforward manner. Thus we can define the term that represents the type
of the acts in which i asks j whether ϕ is the case or not, Ask-if (i , j )ϕ, as an
abbreviation for Req(i , j )(Kiϕ ∨Ki¬ϕ).17
Then by the RUGO principle, we have:
[Ask-if (i , j )ϕ]O( j ,i ,i)((Kiϕ∨Ki¬ϕ)∨KiO( j ,i , j )(Kiϕ∨Ki¬ϕ)∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )(Kiϕ∨Ki¬ϕ)).
Here i is the agent who asks the question and j the agent whom the question is
asked. We will refer to them as “the requester” and “requestee”, and examine how
well we can treat the situation after the act of this type as the situation in which
information is requested.
Now, after the requester i ’s act of asking, if the requestee j knows the answer
and is willing to answer, she ( j ) can meet the generated obligation by saying “yes”
or “no” immediately, since doing so is to see to it that (Kiϕ ∨Ki¬ϕ). Then the
requester i will know that ϕ or know that ¬ϕ accordingly. If the requestee j
is willing to answer but needs to consult books, maps, databases, or whatever
in order to do so, she ( j ) can promise the requester i that she ( j ) will answer
it later. Then, as the PUGU principle indicates, the requester i will know that
the requestee j has committed herself ( j ) to letting her (i ) know that ϕ or know
that ¬ϕ. Thus the requestee j has seen to it that KiO( j ,i , j )(Kiϕ ∨Ki¬ϕ). If the
requestee j cannot answer or decides not to answer for some reason or other, she
( j ) has to let the requester i know that she ( j ) will not commit herself ( j ) to letting
her (i ) know the answer. Doing so is to see to it that Ki¬O( j ,i , j )(Kiϕ ∨Ki¬ϕ).
Thus the RUGO principle captures what j has to do after an yes-no question is
asked in a natural way.18
6. Requesting and commanding again
So far, we have seen that the CUGO principle and the RUGO principle captures
how differently acts of commanding and acts of requesting change situations fairly
well. But now observe that the following principle is an instantiation of the
CUGO principle:
Proposition 6.1. If ϕ is a formula of MEDL and is free of modal operators of the
form O( j ,i ,i), the following formula is valid:
[Com(i , j )(ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ)]O( j ,i ,i)(ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ).
17The author owes this idea to the discussion with Berislav Žarnic´.
18As Grice’s discussion of the examinee’s answer (1969, 106) suggests, however, this model does not
work nicely for questions asked by the examiner in an oral exam. If we combine DMEDL with
the dynamic logic of propositional commitments developed in Yamada (2012), we will be able to
model such a question as a command to the effect that the commandee should commit herself to
the truth or falsity of ϕ.
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Moreover, we can prove the following result:
Theorem 6.1. For each act of requesting, there is an act of commanding with much
more complex content which updates models of DMEDL in exactly the same way as it
does.
Proof. By the definitions of updated models, we have:
MReq(i , j )ϕ =MCom(i , j )(ϕ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) .
uunionsq
Does this mean that acts of requesting are acts of commanding?
We do not think so. As we have seen, an act of requesting of the form Req(i , j )ϕ
and an act of commanding of the form Com(i , j )ϕ change the situation in clearly
different ways from each other. The identity of the model updated by the act
of requesting of the form Req(i , j )ϕ and the model updated by the act of com-
manding of the form Com(i , j )(ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) just means that it
is possible to mimic each act of requesting by an act of commanding which has
a related but carefully crafted much more complex content. But even an act of
commanding of the form Com(i , j )(ϕ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) is different from
an act of requesting of the form Req(i , j )ϕ in that seeing to it that Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ
is a way of obeying Com(i , j )(ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) while it is a way of
refusing Req(i , j )ϕ.19
This consideration, however, reminds us of the following fact:
Fact 1. There are other differences between acts of requesting and acts of commanding,
and DMEDL does not deal with them.
This is not surprising. As Sbisà (2001, 1792) points out, the use of language in
communication is “multi-dimensional · · · , ranging from cognitive to emotional
facets, from actional to affective ones, from social to the subjective”, and DMEDL
is not meant to give a comprehensive account of such a complex phenomenon.
As Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 201) point out, for example, an agent who is-
sues a command invokes a position of institutional authority, whereas an agent
who makes a request does not. This difference enables us to understand why it is
sometimes wise for a person not to issue a command but to make a request even
19“Commands” of the form Com(i , j )(ϕ ∨KiO( j ,i , j )ϕ ∨Ki¬O( j ,i , j )ϕ) could be used as a way of pre-
tending that a commander has control of his men, but requests of the form Req(i , j )ϕ could not.
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in a situation in which she is in a suitable position of authority over the addressee.
Invoking her position of authority overtly can be impolite and offensive.20 In or-
der to deal with the differences of this kind we need to extend our language and
models. To do so, however, will not amount to abandoning what we have devel-
oped but to extending it, and we believe that DMEDL has successfully isolated one
important dimension in which the workings of acts of requesting, commanding,
and promising are compared.
7. Concluding remarks
Fact 1 seems to require us to further reflect on what are captured by the CUGO
principle, the PUGO principle, and the RUGO principle. The existence of other
differences DMEDL ignores suggests a possibility that there is a class of illocution-
ary acts whose members are differentiated from each other only by those differ-
ences. According to Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 201), the difference between
acts of commanding and acts of ordering consists in the fact that the position of
power an act of ordering invokes need not be institutionalized while the posi-
tion of power an act of commanding invokes must be institutionally authorized.
This in turn suggests that the characteristic the CUGO principle captures, though
stated in reference to acts of commanding, is not specific to acts of commanding
but is shared by acts of commanding and acts of ordering. And indeed there seems
to be a sub-class of directive acts that share this characteristic, namely the class of
directive illocutionary acts that do not allow for the option of refusal. This class
seems to include at least telling in the directive sense, requiring, and demanding as
well as commanding and ordering. Similarly, the characteristic the RUGO prin-
ciple captures seems to be shared by acts of asking in the directive sense. Whether
there are any commissive acts other than promising that share the characteristic
the PUGO principle captures, however, does not seem clear and requires further
investigation.
The CUGU principle, the PUGU principle, and the RUGU principle, on the
other hand, seem to capture the common characteristic shared by all illocutionary
acts in their respective specific forms, namely the necessity of the securing of
uptake. The understanding to be secured is often considered as the understanding
of the intention of the speaker, but the above principles requires something more
objective or public, namely the understanding of the changes brought about in
the deontic aspects of the situations.
The way these principles are shown to hold was, however, slightly too easy. As
we have seen, we need to model the differences in the (un)certainty of agents as
20Geis (1995) emphasizes the importance of the matters of “face” in criticizing the standard theory
of speech acts.
80
Tomoyuki Yamada | Acts of Requesting in Dynamic Logic of Knowledge and Obligation
regards what has happened. Since standard technique of doing this is available,
our next step will be to extend DMEDL by introducing the product update.
The above reflection also suggests another interesting possibility of further re-
search. The CUGO principle and other principles of “command logic” in fact
enable us to reason at the level of higher generality than that of acts of command-
ing. We can reason generally about the class of directive acts that do not allow
for the option of refusal. Other classes of illocutionary acts, of course, may be
studied in this way as well.
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